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I.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Should the Supreme Court grant Petitioners' Petition for
Writ of Certiorari?
II.

REFERENCE TO OPINION

The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is presently
contained in 82 Utah Adv. Rptr. 38 (May 13, 1988).
III.
1.

JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS

The decision by the Court of Appeals was filed on

May 13, 1988.
2.

An extension of time to file this Response to

Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted by a justice of this
Court on August 9, 1988, allowing this Response to be filed on or
before September 12, 1988.
3.

Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended,

authorized the Supreme Court to transfer to the Court of Appeals
any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original
appellate jurisdiction and, further, the Supreme Court has sole
jurisdiction to grant or deny a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
IV.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, grants
to the Supreme Court discretionary power to grant or deny a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the review of a Court of
Appeals adjudication.

In addition, Rule 43 of the Rules of the

Utah Supreme Court indicates that a Writ of Certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefore.
1

V,
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

On May 28, 1986, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one
of the Judges of the Second Judicial District Court of Utah,
issued a Memorandum Decision ruling in favor or Respondent Davis
County and ordering that a Writ of Mandamus be issued requiring
Clearfield City to issue a Conditional Use Permit to Davis
County.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed on

May 28, 1986.
The appeal of Appellant Clearfield City was originally
docketed in this Court (No. 86-0343).

Later, this Court,

pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann (1953) as amended,
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for what Respondents
hoped would be a final disposition of the case.

The parties

argued the matter before a three judge panel of the Court of
Appeals and on May 13, 1988, a decision of the Court of Appeals
was rendered affirming the decision of the lower Court.
Petitioners and Appellants, not being satisfied with the decision
of the District Court nor the decision of the Court of Appeals,
now request this Court, again, to review the decisions of the
lower Courts.
B.

Statement of Facts

Petitioners have set forth in their Petition a lengthy
Statement of Facts almost identical to the lengthy Statement of
Facts set forth in their Brief to the Court of Appeals.

The

Petitioners7 Statement of Facts in their Petition for Writ of
2

Certiorari fails to focus on the actual reasons why Clearfield
City denied the application of Davis County for a Conditional Use
Permit.

Those facts ignored by Petitioners are as follows:
1.

The hearing before the Clearfield City Planning

Commission lasted approximately two hours.

The official minutes

of the meeting contained no reasons whatsoever for the action
taken by the Planning Commission.

Although Respondent Davis

County made a formal request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, the Clearfield City Planning Commission refused to give
any reasons for the denial of the Conditional Use Permit.
2.

Vern Hamblin, the Chairman of the Clearfield City

Planning Commission, testified one reason he voted against the
Conditional Use Permit was because of the fear people expressed
in the Planning Commission meeting that they could not sleep at
night thinking about the Mental Health treatment facility being
in the adjoining professional office zone.
3.

Vern Hamblin expressed another reason he voted

against the Conditional Use Permit was his fear that by placing
the Mental Health treatment facility next to the Alcohol Recovery
Center future crime problems could be created.

Police Officer

Nelson had stated at the meeting that the new facility would not
increase the crime rate.
4.

In addition, Mr. Hamblin feared that by placing the

treatment facility across the street from the junior high, the
junior high students might induce the patients of the mental
health facility to participate in drugs, thus impeding their
3

treatment, or the patients might introduce the students to drugs.
5.

In the Planning Commission meeting, Vern Hamblin

asked for and obtained a vote of the citizens attending the
meeting as to whether or not they were in favor of the Planning
Commission issuing a Conditional Use Permit.

Only one person

voted for the facility and all others in the audience voted
against it.
6.

The Respondent Davis County appealed the decision of

the Clearfield City Planning Commission to the Clearfield City
Council.
7.

The Clearfield City Council met in a secret

premeeting on October 9, 1984, to which Respondents were not
invited and in which the Conditional Use Permit was discussed by
members of the City Council.

No minutes were taken in the secret

premeeting.
8.

Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a motion in the

public portion of the October 9, 1984, City Council meeting to
uphold the City Planning Commission and deny the appeal for a
Conditional Use Permit.
9.

A City Councilman, Ivan Anderson, testified that the

primary reason he voted against the treatment facility was the
fear that the people in attendance at the meeting had in their
hearts and minds.
10.

Mr. Anderson expressed fear that junior high school

students across the street would "get to" the patients at the
treatment facility and he acknowledged that he thereby completely
4

ignored the opinion of Dr. Russell Williams, a mental health
professional and Director of the Davis County Mental Health
program.
11.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial Court

explained that the Planning Commissions refusal to furnish
written findings or at least provide the basis for its decision
so that Respondent Davis County could intellectually respond on
appeal to the City Council, tended to suggest there was no
rational basis for the Planning Commission's decision.
12.

In its Memorandum Decision the trial Court stated

that although the Court carefully reviewed the verbatim
transcript of the public meetings provided by Davis County, it
found that "nowhere in the transcripts...is there believable
information or evidence on which the Clearfield City Council
could have rationally believed that the proposed mental health
facility would pose any special threat to Clearfield City's
legitimate interest."
13.

The trial Court concluded that the actions of the

Clearfield City Planning Commission and the Clearfield City
Council in denying a Conditional Use Permit to Respondent Davis
County for a mental health transitional facility were arbitrary
and capricious and discriminatory and without substantial basis
in fact.
14.

The trial Court's decision was appealed to the

Supreme Court, who transferred the case to the Court of Appeals
for review and decision.
5

15.

The Court of Appeals issued its decision on May 13,

1988, and concluded as follows:
While the reasons given by the Clearfield City
Council for denying the permit might be
legally sufficient if supported, the trial
Court was correct in concluding that the
offered reasons are without factual basis in
the record. What the Court found to be the
real reason for the action, "public clamor,"
is not an adequate legal basis for the City's
decision. Therefore, we agree with the trial
Court that Clearfield City acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in denying the Conditional
Use Permit for reasons which either had no
factual basis or were not legally sufficient...
ARGUMENT
Petitioners endeavor to persuade yet another Court that
their secretive decision making process based upon fear and
public clamor is justified when two previous Courts have ruled
that the denial of Respondent's request for a Conditional Use
Permit was arbitrary and capricious.

After two days of hearing,

the trial Court concluded that Petitioners' actions in denying
the Conditional Use Permit were arbitrary and capricious and
without substantial basis in fact.

The Court of Appeals in

upholding the trial Court's decision declared,
While the reasons given by the Clearfield City
Council for denying the permit might be
legally sufficient if supported, the trial
Court was correct in concluding that the
offered reasons are without factual basis in
the record.
Petitioners urge that the trial Court and the Court of
Appeals ignored any evidence in the record regarding clustering
or dispersing of Mental Health treatment facilities.
6

Petitioners

even suggest that the failure of the Court of Appeals to address
this central issue is "not only an egregious violation of
judicial procedure, but also denies other cities and planners the
opportunity to examine the validity of this argument as it
relates to their own problems of conditional uses."
The decision of the Court of Appeals does not deny City
Planners anything.

City Planners and City Planning Commissions

are not precluded from dispersing or clustering mental health
treatment facilities, but City Planners and City Planning
Commissions cannot deny Conditional Use Permits to mental health
treatment facilities simply because of public clamor.

The clear

message of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals is that a city
must have believable information or evidence to support a
rational belief that a proposed mental health facility will pose
a threat to the city's legitimate interests.

The clear message

from the Court of Appeals to City Councils is that secret
premeetings of the City Council where the merits of a conditional
use application are discussed and where information is relied
upon for the decision will not be tolerated by the Court.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals addressed the central
issue relating to disbursing or clustering of mental treatment
facilities but concluded,
Even if the reasons given in the motion
adopted by the City Council might otherwise
be legally sufficient, see Note 1, supra, the
denial of a permit is arbitrary when the
reasons are without sufficient factual
basis....
7

Petitioners urge that the decision of the Court of
Appeals substantially affects nearly all small cities and
municipalities in Utah.

Petitioners urge that the decision of

the Court of Appeals has held that in cases involving Conditional
Use Permits it is required that any aggrieved litigant from the
Planning Commission must appeal such decisions to the Board of
Adjustment.

However, if the holding of the case is that urged by

Petitioners, the Court of Appeals would have reversed the
decision of the lower Court and remanded the case with
instructions for the Board of Adjustment to hear the appeal of
Respondent Davis County.
After specifically addressing the question of disbursing
or clustering mental health treatment facilities the Court of
Appeals held "...Clearfield City acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in denying the Conditional Use Permit for reasons
which either had no factual basis or were not legally
sufficient."

Since the statements of the Court of Appeals

concerning the Board of Adjustments and appeals thereto are
merely dicta, the Court of Appeals has not decided an important
question of municipal law which must now be settled by this
Court.

In fact, the ruling of the Court of Appeals as noted in

its conclusion, is entirely consistent with prior decisions of
this Court.
CONCLUSION
It is manifestly unfair to Respondents for this Court to
grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari when two other Courts
8

have already ruled that the action of Petitioners was arbitrary
and capricious.

The mental health treatment facility has now

been in operation for well over a year without any complaints
from the City, the school, or surrounding neighbors.

Petitioners

seek to mask their dissatisfaction of the decisions of two other
Courts by claiming a holding that does not exist.

The real

reason and holding of the Court of Appeals turned on the
arbitrary and capricious conduct of Petitioners.

Respondent

Davis County, therefore, urges this Court to deny the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari of Petitioners.
Respectfully submitted this

%tt\ day of September,

1988.

Hess
Chief "Civil Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the Court of Appeal for the State of Utah and to Craig S. Cook,
Attorney at Law, 3645 East 3100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84109, this
^fk day of September, 1988.
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Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals

38

B,R. Woodward Marketing ••Collins Food Service

IV. CONCLUSION
We agree that Woodward, by its conduct,
waived its, right to incentive commissions
under the sales agreement with Collins. The
evidence is incontroverted that Woodward
was aware, of the existence of its right to
receive compensation pursuant to paragraph
3(b) and that it knew such a claim had to be
documented by a daily saks report and submitted monthly. Nonetheless, Woodward
decided to '"roll over and play dead" as it was
"more than willing to settle for $45,000 a
year/ It was not until after the relationship
was terminated that Woodward sought what it
knew it was entitled to receive during the
entire course of its employment. Such
conduct, notwithstanding whatever unexpressed subjective intent Woodward's principal
had, unequivocally evinced an intent to waive
its right to claim the incentive commissions.3
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
decision granting Collins* motion for
summary judgment.
Gregory K. OTTO*, Judge

WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Pamela TV Greenwood, Judge

CODE*CO

82 Utah Adv. Rep. 35

Proto. Lflh

Cite as

•2 Utah Adv. Rep. 38
IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic of the State
of Utah, and Victor Smith,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of Utah, and the
Clearfield City Planning Commission,
Defendants and Appellants.
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings and Orme.
No. 860343-CA
FILED: May 13, 1988
SECOND DISTRICT
Honorable Douglas C. Cornaby
ATTORNEYS:
Craig S. Cook for Appellant.
Gerald E. Hess for Respondent.
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r.r/1937). In th* instant case, ORME; Judge:
jtfVe to waiver are undisputed
Clearfield City seeks reversal of a district
5-trial court's conclusion that
: Woodward waived its claim is court order issuing an extraordinary writ in
of taw. See Diversified the nature of a writ of mandamus. The writ
Eqtsfrie*. Inc.v/AfikHcAn S*v. & loan Ass'n, 739 ordered Clearfield City to issue Davis County
PMlUh
1136 (.ytakQ. App. 1987) ("Where the a conditional use permit for a group home.
facts are n o t ^ material dispute, interpretation
We affirm.
placed thereon by trial,court (x*comes a question of
law ..„").
FACTS
2. Of course, if* is Collins' position that no such
On June 25, 1984, Davis County made
commissions ware owed under the contract. A application with the Clearfield City Planning
timely assertion by Woodward would have permitted
the parties an opportunity to address the contractual Commission for a conditional use permit to
ambiguity and adjust the terms to comport with operate a residential treatment program for
their negotiation* and actual understandings. As to adolescents and adults suffering from substWoodward's fear that such an inquiry would have ance abuse. The proposed site was adjacent to
resulted in termination of the contract, it is inconc- another building operated by Davis County,
eivable that Collins, having just entered into the known as the Addiction Recovery Center
contract with Woodward, would have terminated (*ARC*). The sale of the property to Davis
the contract if Woodward had sought nothing more County by Victor Smith had been made
than its due pufe* the contract.
subject to approval of the County's plans by
I. While tbetrtttfttmrt reached the correct result Clearfield City.
applying the doctrine of waiver, other courts have
A public hearing to consider the permit was
reached the same result, on similar facts, under
cither an estoppel or contract theory. See, e.g., held on July 18 by the Clearfield City PlanCelmer v. Sdunto, 198 Mont. 271, 645 P.2d 946, ning Commission. A number of citizens atte94§ (1982) (An employee would be estopped from nded and raised concerns about parking, an
claiming compensation for overtime work where he increased crime rate, and the reduction of
failed to report it or to inform his employer that he property values in the vicinity. Concerns were
expected compematioo for it until he instituted suit also voiced that the use of the property for a
after his discharge). Cf. Abraxas v. Horizon Corp., group home would be incompatible with the
0 7 Ariz. 71f 669 TM 51, 57 (Ariz. 1983) "residential* nature of the surrounding area.
fttirrnrinV ilm umnnf •iirm of objection to employer's fa&Bt •<* pay: commissions precluded appli- The commission denied the application in a
cation of doctrine that any-course of performance three 40 one vote, refusing to give any reason
acquiesced hi without objection is given great weight for its decision. As required by city ordinance,
lsiateil>rc««tfe*nf tmbtguous agreement).
MM

U T A H AfWANCRftEFORTS

t

nuances within, the various
aoa*ywhjcb
_ -i^]i;llW> > dii ; 'Sefiteittbf-w''i^^ the authority
flatter consideration deferred to QctojEi||£.'"* - ordinances tp il^mic^al^fe
The OearfWd Ch> P & ^
ciaJ review of fcc*l zoning pr j
meeting' oe October 9 <t^
O ^ m ^ necessarily d * M M » 3 » J ^
conditional, use pennit. The aearfidd City sute a<tmmfctrattvc ptdaaftre act is; < y P ^
Manager presented two maps to-the GTty able an interpretation of the enabling Jegt*
Council at the pre-meeting which were not ation, and the provisions of the pertinent iocai
presented it any public hearing. One map ordinance.5ee*dk
identified 'neighborhoods* where the impact
A. Review pursuant to state administrative
would be greatest if another group home was
procedure act
permitted. Based on the City Manager's assUtah's newly created and long overdue
essment, the two facilities combined would
constitute H * of the neighborhood he iden- Administrative Procedures ActK kjtah Code
tified. The other
^W^*jtMmfm
a^t* t i g ^
zones and the k*ai<» rf baskT
within a one raik diameter at
topeofrned n i s t r e t i ^ ^
site. These services included the Pioneer January i^ 1 9 ^ 1917 5 l | u * ^ ^ ^ ^ |
School for the mentally handicapped* the §315,. it dpes not j ^ y tp j c ^
ARC facility, the Cldirfield Convalescent pending at Us tffecav*,date. Sec An$dlv^
Center, and the Division of Family Services Board of Review, 750 PJd ^11, 612 nJ2 (Uah
Ct. App. 19*8). Moreover, untikc in spine
Center.
In the formal poakm of the October-9 states, the Utah act applies only to state, and
meeting, Councilwoman Reed made a motion not to locaTageiKkM See Vtah Code Ann.
to uphold the Planning Commission's decision §63-46b-i(l} f l 9 « £ t i e #tah act specifand to deny the appeal for a conditional use ically excludes application to "any political
permit. The motion ^carried.1 Davh County subdivision pf the ^ate^>r any admini^raiivc
mm of a poU*k^ subtfviston of the, S|aie7
then .&lo&*|ife£K4^
the a c t i « * ^ f c * Gity C o ^ ^
ning Commission were unconstitutional and
B. Hrvtew pemaatlft zoning stataie
asking the courHto issue a writ of mandamus
Likewbe, ; ^ contmy lo^he c h ^ n g e requiring
stkm on ^
use
from1

i*Th£x&*mut fonnd that
in denying the permit was
lous^dtettattstttc&T;
basir Jfcincfc: The court upN»
City zoofaig, ordinance a*
found ttar the city uncoi
it because there was no rati
bash to deny the permit. Qearfi^'i request
for a *tay^of judgment was siflw^uemly
denied aadAis appeal followed J
Beforetotniii*to the n * ^
is noce^arr to review both the pcopcr procedure fo^jadidal review of the-ofey^s action
and tbea^pHc^blestandar^of wrtew.

1ikt
any dedskto « T
ttmenf- may -MV&' « r t S a i n t a i n ^
plenary action t6t**m 'therefrom
in' any court of competent jurisdic^
tion ... v
Utah Code Ann, ii^f-15 <»«$: \
The city artfe that DUvis^^ttnty did hot
follow the proper procedure ASr Judicial teview
of the Qty Cbuncav decision because Oavis
County *hou& tove ttmimcnced the Vihd df

In this cite, however* Davis County was not
in need of revfcr pf a board oTad)ustmcat
decision. It w u aggrieve*? by action of the
City Council ifrirtning the decision of the
Planning Onnmissfcisi. There it so statutory
recourse siimlar |j^|JO-W 5 tbr review of
city councfl actie^-Uppareut^
the
county with no recourse other than to obtain
review by the traditional nteans of seeking an
extraordinary writ or, more precisely, appropriate relief available where no other adequate
remedy exists. See Utah R. Civ. P. 658(a),
0>X3).

1136. The ordinance at issue m MNuwm
reouired that variaaoi reauetti be sufatahtodso
ootn tne ooaitt or^adjusuucBt wet tot |nao*
ning commission, wto appeal to 'the city
council. The Court found that th* ekf% procedures conflicted wkh the enabling act by
vesting the city council; rather than the board
of adjustment, with final authority over the
determination-whether cor not to grant variances from the zoning ordinances. 714 P.2d at
1137. See Schcrbd K Stir Uke City Cotp*, 81
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (1988) (board of adjustment rather than city council is appropriate
body to hear zoning appeals from planning
C. Review pursuant to ordinance
commission under council-mayor form of
Notwithstanding the unavailability of ftat- BOveruBMSBtj*
utory irview ipluoiiaiit to §K>*94$, the ' & ?
Wlffle tie Ctearffctd Oty ordinance differs
claims, that Davis'County was nonetheless from the one in Chambers, it nonetheless also
required to appeal as prescribed by Clearfield M s to provide for final review of' zoning
City ordinance. The section of the Clearfield matters by a board of adjustment as required
City ordinance governing the issuance of by §10-9-15 and endeavors to vest; the City
conditional use permits, at least as reproduced Council with the final determination of conin our record, provides that appeals from the ditional use permits. A legislative body may
Planning Commission must proceed to review act as a board of appeals only when the creby the City Council. Appeals from the city ation of a board of adjustment is not statutcouncil must then be taken to a court of orily mandated.4 See 7 Rohan, Zoning and
competent jurisdiction pursuant to a provision Land Use Controls §49.01(51 (1986) <**f the
similar, but not identical to, §10-9-15. creation of a zoning hoard is mandatory, a
That ordinance provision provides, in relevant local legislative body cannot reserve unto itself
part, with our emphasis added:
the sole power to gram w4eny variances.?) See
Any person aggrieved by or affalso Schcrbel v, Salt Lake (Sty Corp.* 81
ected by any decision of die jBovd
Utah Adv. R*fx-*,46 (*tl* authority to
Of Adjustment -or the City Council
resolve *ming d l ^ i 4 i | ^ # r o p e # " t « r t « e ^
my $ m and ^ maintain 41 plenary
tive function mfrcy#q»r»*<^btffr* < ^ ) v '*v
•etttp f<* jejicf therefrom in wok
dnutidif canfrieteDt jurisdiction,
about f
&^$m£mi&dl
in the diarict court,
the city castnoF«fcer the soope *ad&ppdure
tor »view nguirtd by. $10-9-1* bkjfopfy
inserting tlwuwoi*- ^ the City Cowdt^ into
its ordinance^,Where a route of review is
provided by estate statute, a municipality
lacks the power to alter that scheme. See, e.g.,
Cusbiag rv Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 820 (Me.
1983).
The Utah Supreme Court recently found a
similar procedure invalid because it conflicted
with Utah's enabling act, Utah Code Ann.
§§10-9-1, XQ . 1 1 (1986). Chambers v.
Smithtidd Otyf 714 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah
1986). The enabling act provides that the legislative body ofuj^tity, such as Clearfield's
city cqundfcJgMjfa^jM& to regulate zoning.

hut i^4>iimMmmm *!# paver, th*

UTAH ADV

use peimif
City

onsistent
act Kavmg 4 M » 7

f
*fj& k* envisioned in
method of district ^
that act.*
Since the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act does not apply to local agencies and this is
not an appeal pursuant to §10-9-15 *or
any other stanitoriiy-prescribed scheme,
Davis County^was entitled to seek.jwfidal
review through a procedure traditionally used
where review is not otherwise provide foe
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civfl Procedure
recognizes that appropriate reliefujnpgjh&e
granted'where the jdief sought is
^•WwfjPiif

board

^#*^F^pa^wpa^|

%^

court may take additional evidence so long as
it is rctcvia* to the issues that were raised ami.
considered by the board.* Id. at 1035. Seeato
The unique procedural posture of this case Hona v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W. 2d
results in some confusion over the applicable 409, 416 (Minn. 1981); 3 Anderson, American
standard of review both at the trial court level Law of Zoning $27.32 (1986) (a court revieand on appellate review. While the appeal is wing a decision of » local zoning board may,
taken from an administrative decision, the take additional evidence if necessary to aid in
case found its way to cfistrict court in the the fair disposition of the case). Xanthos
context of a petition fot an extraordinary writ. involved the question of the proper standard
Thus* the nature of review by the district court of review under §10-9*15, which is not the
was a hybrid proceeding involving some ele- basis for this appeal as explained above.
ments of administrative review and some ele- However, its reasoning applies at least as
ments of an independent civil'action. That is, readily to an action commenced pursuant to
the trial court did not limit its review to con- Rule 65B to secure a writ.
sideration of the record, 4$ is typically the case
Even though the record was perhaps more
in reviewing administrative decisions where a extensive In this case tha& ftifci&d in zoning,
record is available,, but heard two days of matters, we fmd the trial court was justified inextensive testimony from various witnesses as receiving additional evidence for at least two
is more typical of an independent civil action.
reasons. First, the tnal court was concerned
A. Trial Court Review of Administrative
about the secretive nature and lack of any
record or minutes of the City Council's "pre*
Clearfield City argues that the trial court meeting.' Second, notwithstanding Davis
erred in handling review of a city council County's request, the Planning Commission
decision as, in effect, a trial de novo and that refused to give its reasons for denying the
the court should have been limited to consid- permit and the City Council refused to enter
eration of whether, on the record, the formal findings in support of its decision.
council's action was arbitrary and capricious Thus, in order to determine whether the action
and not supported by substantial evidence. taken by the City Council was so unreasonable
The Utah Supra** Court recently addressed a as to be arbitrary and capricious, the trial
similar argument in Xanthos v. Board of court received additional evidence to ascertain
Adjustment, 685 ?M UB2, (Utah 1984), what transpired at the pre-c&eetmg and to
which involved afe*ppeai l& the district court discover the city's actual reasons, for denying
lwi«ttH^49\4Ntt^l^^0i^^ decision toy * the permit.7
botjtf^*4fcb|ient denying a variance. After
ftr AppeBate Review df
mtitwaj
(, lor we nave
wkDti.
thbeoun
fi
the
fctfy*
skm gad ordered the board to grant the vari1
ance. Sab Lake Oft argued, as Clearfield d t y k nonetheless precluded froojgfvftig deference
argues in this case, that the court was limited to the trial « ^ d6cisi^l^ fteietd, it it often
to consideration of whether the boards actkm stated thai aa appellate <Mnt otfes no particprior review
was arbitrary and capricious and not suppo- ular 4eference to a trial court's
9
of
particular
agency
action.
rted by substantial evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court defined the scope
of review contemplated by the terms 'plenary See, e.g., Tccbnomcdical Labs, Inc. v. Securities
action* as used nr §10-9^15. #The nature Div., 744 P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 'When a
and extent of the w i e w depends on what lower court has reviewed the administrative decision
happened bdow as reflected by g tine record and the court's judgment is challengedtonappeal,
we review the administrative decision jtst as *f the
of the proceedings, viewed in the light of appeal
had come directly from the agency/ Id. at
accepted due process requirements/ Id. at 321 n.l. See also Bcamon v, Utah Statefid.of OiL
1034 (quoting Denver* Rio Grande Western Gas& Mining, 675 P.2d 1135,1139 (Utah 19S3>, .
R. R. Co. v. Cm&atvWehtt Sewer ImproveThis doctrine, of course, makes sense only in the
mentDfat,, 4 Utah 2d 105. 2S7 P.2d 884, 887 context of review of agency action an g record. The
court ordinarily gives no presumptioolot
(is*s»^ibs^jgjg^^gwtet in ace- appellate
correctness to the lower court d ? ? ^ ^«cat^tt«
mi$w&m^ m*i*t*cord tower court's review of the a&nlntoi^^ll^6W%
$£fflfywte%
^^^Mmf^^
taisf AXtinafttf' mote
1
#wf*****few: 8ou
' ^ ^ f *fe
A. STANDARD* O? REVIEW AND

vwme
to be w^kmr^^^i^^

kanlrwhen the tiM xm^'het^
MIWCCWR

^ f

tek^at^Attmt

witnesses, ai in this
om^^mh00m^L
mindful of the M v a n p | ^ | | ^ f ^ j | ^ ^ f ^

ordertt>make that determination, the district 779, 779 (Utah 1986). See alio Jensen
UTAH ABVANCE REPORTS
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.advaattfrf posfekm of the trfal

s^rhTtt

UMH- VIUMV

nwnw

were pcrma*

tt^d.
With regard to the concern over real estate
\ values, the court fmmd that no studies were
lams on lh± adftrinlmeUve record, wegflp Jjii jM •
tartar deference to the trial coot* Batfesdftr#*# made and no camions Vere given by professtarns on the testimony of witnesses, we defer to tbe ional itai estate appraisers nor was any credible evidenos of reduoed property values protrial ceart^t advantaged position.
duced at the hearings. In a similar vein, two
IH. TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
professional planners were
The trial court concluded that the Planning
employed by the
Commission's action in denying the conditi- city but iwfther voiced any objection to granonal use permit and the City Council's actum ting the application.
in upholding the denial were arbitrary* and
Even If the reasons given in the motion
capricious and without substantial basil in adopted by the council might otherwise be
legally sufficient, see Note 1, supra, the denial
sing CcMBmisskm and the City PmmiiMifiril"" Of a permit UarbitnftT when the,/e*ic«tff
imituuonally applied the appiicabk provisions lkv$.; fee. V Village of Shtoevitwr
of the zoning ordinance.
HWM 320 (Minn. 1981). In Shorcvkw,
A. Lack of evidence supporting dty'sdedrfen several singte-famfly homeowners objected to
In tot memorandum decision, the trial court the use of land in their vicinity for construcexplained that the Planning Commission's tion of multiple dwellings. At the public
refusal to furnish written findings or ar least fluffing, they expressed concerns about traffic
provide the basis for its decision so that Davis problems, reduced property values, and
County could intelligently respond on appeal density, l W court in Sborcview reviewed these
to the City Council, tended to suggest there reasons and concluded that the ptamiag
was no rational basis for die Planning Com- commission'* stated reasons for denying the
mission's decision. With regard to the City special use permit, an action which was upheld
Council** decision, although the court catef- by tJ^ ^ty <^unci did noi^$9?t-ff&*»l
ufiy reviewed the verbatim transcript oPthe support ia^he 'vague reieryatio^^rtpmwj
public meetings provided by Davis County, it by either the single family owners or the
found that •nowhere in the transcripts ;/. if eommission members/ /A at 325-The court
ttere believable information or: evidence on found the rcasom did «©Uii^^
which the Clearfield City Council
l#offa%t bdleved dial the
caeeteltftlecWofis'),

mostpwu fl«Ned«itestimony
po«rt over |^ tw<> day Period in an
ttoestain whaube b*sis for the <*#A
ac&Mftpiik
The court found that the pre-meetin| taW *pubfie
^ , W W f _ . r i « . _ . 74r-w^.
by the Oty Council on October % although sufficient basis for
deny&g the permit. The
•ostensibly a public meeting, was not an court explained:
Open meeting, yet the merits of Davis
Indeed, there is almost uniform
County's application were discussed and
public
clamor -when any mental
council members obviously relied on infortnhealth, facility, halfway house, .jail
arioitsuppfced in that meeting. The court also
or ^prison U proposed* The public
found that the maps presented and relied upon
realizes the need for such facilities,
in the prt-meeting were arbitrarily drawn and
but they should always be located
were not presented or explained at the pubtk
somewhere else .... Citizen oppose
meeting.
tkm «t a consideration which nju*t
In its findings, the court reviewed A e
be wfij^ed, but cannot be
reason* «ugg$stod at trial forite
i
j^l^deciskmtodeny.
#pialofdie permit and found that
because of its
ptftnoit the court
IpDsmty School
K'adtf^inwtrators
' «6^ppo« tiw
police

D»vfrfffl
Uu*.
solicitation of or reliance on tht
neighboring landowner* ^jlfc
$hboring landowners may jw ''
tcriaa for the issuance
#waluse permit.*,
In a case factualist,
one, the

BJ«ffig' M<a *
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facts, and not ymc*c emotion or
local opinion-'*-j6akin« such a
dedsion.

Mr'a v.
2d 335, 34& (j

?tfi6

• CMcrcte
of the
t-whmdcterminii*^
«ftre-*£|
Mopmcnt permit * &m#' W^Cfcmtf
€ZCo*tiaA**
Comm'rs v. Teton County Y6mh' Services
While the reasons g^ve*1fy> the aearfieid
to*, 652 P.2d 400, 411 (Wyo, 1982), te thto
case, the county commission denied an appli- City Counal for denyuV&e permit might be
cation for a development permit, submitted by legally sufficient if supported, the trial court
Youth Services, to use an existing facility as was correct in concluding: that the offered
an alternative residential treatment center for reasons are without factual basis in the record.
the care and treatment of juveniles in need of What the court found to be the real reason for
supervision or emotional and socially hand- the action, "public clamor/ ia not an adeqicapped. The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed uate legal basis for the city's decision. Therwith the trial court that the commission's efore, we agree with the trial court that Cleadecision had to be set aside since the commi- rfield City acted arbitrarily and capriciously m
ssion found that neighfew jnpposed t*>e; pro- denymg the conditional use permit foe reasons
posed development and ttm^ipomrt couW not which either had no factual basts or were not
legally sufficientsTBe^ause we, gnd ; thc decision
determine the weight th*
arbitrary and capricious/ we tytve n o need to
such ^unautr % " ~ " *"*
consider w b c g i ^ t l p , ^ * * pr$nance w*$
decision./d. at
unconstitutional on its /ace or a& applied,1*.
ha another
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision.
uffitmei
Gregory K. Q t m c Jndg*
* <X A]
WE CONCUR:
:awrit
Pamela T . Greenwood, fudge
the c o w t y board to
JudithM. Billings, Judge
permit t o aBo* f r to
treatment facility. The district CTOrtrdehi£3^r
wnt,*nd the city a p p e a l e d * ^ ^ M t a a e ^ a 1. The motion referred toihelottfewufe'reasons?
Clearfield's responsiveness ro
com*
munity and the County'* special needs
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying
by four structured residential and resithe city's application and reversed th4 bSigffcl
dential-type facilities within the radius
court and remanded with instructions to isiue
of one mile; and that 11^ of the land
the writ of mandamus ordering thfc county
would be designated to this particular
board to issue the conditional use permit, 386
type of structured residential .use; and
N.W. 2d at 776. The court in Bstrnunt, noting
that to uphold the Clearfield* master
that the failure by the county board to Make
plan and zoning ordinance *o minimize
sufficient findings in support of its decision
the changes of the characteristics of the
neighborhood.
made the court's task of review "highly inip|* because *Tt]here is no way to detettatoeJftoni the record ... ; what the
1 We are^dvised that;
the motion
stay* the
with
wis when it denied
Smith,
/renova^
as might
the
^ipose, and has
Upon concerns aired by property owners ar the large residence to
continuously operated the treatment facility for
puSlic meeting. The court stated that though some two years now.
these sentiments may be weighed in a zoning 3* While some states have specifically made their
decision, "they may not be the sole basis for administrative procedure acts applicable to-local
granting or denymg a given permit/ Idr The agencies, at least one sane ha»i*chfty«d the ume
court characterized the county's decision hi result through the interpretation of rate of procedure, See, e.g., Board of Catmy, Comas >rs v. Teton
these terms:
County Youth Serv* Inc^ « i FM 400,416 *Wyo.
ftl decision appears to have been
J9tt). Assuming favorable experience with the Utah
a response &%P*tite oppose
Adrninistrative Procedures Act, the'tigislafure mayt
This U a n insufficient basis
in due course, wish to consider extending Its appHwhich t * deny a conditional
cauon to local agencies.
use permit. A county must rely e n

W'jWwiiPoim

4. The enabling act for city zoning b different from
the enabling act for county zoning. The county act
makes the decision to appoint a board of adjustment discretionary with the comity
rather than mandatory ay under the city
act. Chamber* v. SmithMd Chy, 714 PM BIS,
M 37 (Utah 1986).
5. The county might have premised its attack on the
City Council's action on the ground that the council
was not authorized to hear the zoning appeal. See,
e.g., Scncrbd v. Sail Lake Gty Corp., Si Utah
Adv. Rep. at 16. It did not do so. Nor does the city
contend in this appeal that the county should have
appealed to a body other than the City Council, a
position it would in any event be estopped from
asserting. The city's point is that the City Council
funcaoned as * kind of board of adjustment attd
that, therefote, judical review ofiu decision should
have been accomplished in the same way as review
of board of adjustment decision!.
6. By either route, mandamus or review pursuant to
the statute* the case would have ended up in district
court, it may be that denominating the proceeding
as "mandamus* or as A "plenary action* under §109-15 is neither determinative nor 'anything other
than a technicality which did not adversely affect
the rights of the parties;" Crist v. Maptetoa City.
497 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1971) (Crockett, J., dissenting). The city apparently believes its decision
would be entitled to more deference if
under $ H W 1 than in the context of a
araus action. Of eouae* whatever mhtfaat benefit
the county receives by virtue of ft* appeal >MpgJft
the mandamus context is a direct consequence of the
city's own questionable procedure for obtaining 4
conditional use permit.
7. We note that in taking additional evidence and
making its detailed findings, the trial cowt ppie a
fair and disciptioed effort to understand the t$sts
for the a r / s docision. In no sense did fc venture
notion $ wfcaeiyaf » $ e keif imerestttfthe citizen*" «fc CkufiMCto.
Xanthm * Board 0/Ad>
UtfmerH,685FS*»(B5/
t. That notionfc*r*braysbeen a hit of t o overstatement, Even if jx* strictly required, deference is no
doubt given when the. trial court1* analysis k illuminating. CL 2km Bkm Nml*J Bank v. Nation*!
Am. Tide Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 198S)
("Although we may not defer to a trial court's
conclusion on a legal question, we certainly may
derive great benefit from the trial judge's views on
the issue and may be persuaded by those views.").
In any case, the Utah practice of duplicative, two*
tiered judicial review of agency action has been timeconsuming and inefficient. The Utah Administrative
Procedures Act wisely breaks from this approach.
Informal agency action, where no record is made,
will be reviewed in district court on a trial drnovo
basis, in cooaccsto w ^ wrudt a record wiH be
generated.
(19*6),
record ^
agency i
Court.

~~-"4&#

at t^f^B^c^fitf^H

the curio** ^

in attrndancy were asked to vote on the J
Ctory one person voted for the facility j "
fothcaiidicacevfredapnrair.
It. M noted In s e a m 4(e) of thH optmoa, the
dty*s ordinance it inconsistent with generally applicable state 1fef, «t least insofar as it vesta ta thejchy
conned* rather than a board of adjustment, the final
word on applications for conditional use permits, in
that sense* the ordinance is unconsuiutionaj, pader
the supremacy clause contained in Utah Con«, Art.
XI. §5. See AUgoot v, Zjuson, 545 P Jtf 530. 532
(Utahl976K

tk VtA ***. Rep. 4f
IN T H E
U T A H COURT OP A P PEAES
Rkhard F. BRIMLEY,
Plaintiff *ndApp*tant,
Joseph S. GASSER, Jn,
Defendant gad Respondent.
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson n d
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DAVIDSON, JMfe:

PmM^Mmk

taey

appeals ftptiTffy

district court's order which: 1) granted defendant Joaepb Cesser's motions for satlsftction of judgtociit and relief from judgment;
and 2) t^i»^$wipflt
motion that tie W*s
entitled id > Qeftain personal property ' o f
Gasser's which Brimley had purchticd at a
sheriffs sale,.
Although the parties to this appeal iWre a
lengthy history, it is sufficient to
M
* y ,»• Wk * * » Brimiejr4*u&»4]

Set

(19*6). 1 H
doing
evaluating*
records and resoMnglegal issues.
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RULE 41

Rules of Che Utah Supreme CoRrt

RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF
LAW BY UNHSD STATES COURTS
(a) Aethertaattoa la Answer Qairtoni of Law.
(¥> Proccdarv ta iaveet.
(e) C^rtfffcsflee Oretr.
<d) Form oi C i i U f l m l M O r * r ; Saeanadna of Rtcefd.
(t> Acctptaeee * rftsjeetteaof Ctftificaflae.

0)F*s*.

UTAH COM

of acceptance (i) the specific question ^question*
accepted, (ii) those portions of the record which
shall be copied and fifed with the Oerk of this
Court, and (iii) a schedule for the filing of briefs
and for oral argument by the parties. The form of
briefs and proceedings on oral argument shall thereafter be governed by Rules 21 and 40 of these
rules. It may be presumed that the Court will give
ttiffiiftttfT -fflflfldiiffLfrtt tattm j

(ft fee*.
(a) AissMtaalss*** Assrwer Questions of Law.

H K Utah Supreme Court may in its discretion
answer a^gwminn of litah law certified to it by a
court xtigteAMattd Stitet when requested to do so
tot^suqh certi^wg court acting in accordance with
th* pwvueons of this Rale, but only if the state of
the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before
the certifying court is uncertain and answering the
certified question win not unduly interfere with the
Utah Supreme Court's regular functioning or be
inconsistent with the timely and orderly development
of the decisional law of the state.

The feet for ffling an otUer of cettlffcatioa in this
Court shall be the same as for filing and docketing a
notice of appeal id a civil appeal in the Court, and
the cost shall be equally divided between the parties
to the cause unlets otherwise ordered by the certif
ytng court in itt order of certification.
(g) AseocteiJe* e l CoaeseJ.

Upon acceptance by the Court of the question of
law presented by the certification order, counsel for
the parties not licensed to practice law in the state
of Utah shall associate a member in good standing
of the Utah State Bar in connection with all further
(a) Procedure to Invoke*
proceedings before the Court.
Any court referred to in paragraph (a) may (a) Issuance of Optakm oa Certified Questions.
invoke this Rule by entering an order of certification
The Court will issue a written opuuosrthat will be
as described in tint Ruler When invoking this Rule,
published and reported. A copy of the opinion shall
the certifying court may .act either sua sponte or
be transmitted by the Oerk under the seal of the
upon a motion by any party,
Court to the csrtifymg court and to the parties ide4
(cTCertlflcatk* Order.
ntifiedm the certification order.
ft? ft certification order shall be. directed to the
UtA Supreme Courttodshall state;
TITLE V t JURISDICnON <Hi ,W1IT OF
(!) the question oi hrWtp be answered;
CERTIORARI TO COURT OK ACTEALS
(ii) that the question' certified is a controlling
issue o r law hi a j*0cee&ng pending before the RUU42.RlCTIIWOFJUI>amr^
cmirying court; tad
AND DECREES Of? COURT OF ARfKALS
0H) that there appears to be no controlling
Unlets otherwise provided by Jaw,'$e review ox jtj
Utah law.
judgment, an order, and a 0>cree (herein referred/hi
Q The ofdtf shah* i S o set ferth aO facts which at 'decisions*) of the Court of Appeals shall b |
are relevant to the Jettfttthisfton of the question initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to th£
certified and which v d w fat nature of the contro- Supreme Courtof Utah.
versy, tW context iM w^iich the question arose, and
the procedural steps by which the question was RULE 43. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING
REVIEW OF CERTIORARI
framed.
Review
by a writ of certiorari it not a matter of
(3) The certifying court may alto include in the
order any additional reason for its entry of the right, but of jadfcial1 discretion, and wffl be granted
only when there are special and important reatona
certtficatioa onier tsutt«re«otothefwise apparent.
therefor. The foflowing, while neither
(4) *arsa of CertJflcatk* Order; SataWoa of
nor whoHy measuring the Court's discretion,
Record.
cate the character of reasons that wflt be comidere*
A certification order shall be prepared by the
(I) When a panel of the Court of Appeals hat
certifymg, court, signed by'the fadge presiding over rendered a decision in conflict with** decision of
the pr^ctofijog giving rtgLto toe certification order, another panel of the Court of AppeeJroo the tamjj
and fdrw>*W to t h e 0 ^ Supreme Court by the issue of law;
d
(2* When, a. panel *f the. Court of Appeals heel
decsdad a ajuesticw of jaa^txot>ft4tttl sty in a mm
certified coptet of aa of laW Mf4M of.ihe record thalfceiroatfhft with^a^ealsaaa efthiaCewa;
before the certifying eourt « n A U with this Court
ffl) WlMat panel of t t e < k s » o&Apftsalt J
if, in the opkdewmm^^'M
<t*or* or a reno>ed *4ecu»0Q that,eat to fe<4ept*te*/
portJoo thereof'inayW^mosail»r1n determining the accepted and usual oottest *f jnrtirtis j
whether to accept the cMffied *aes*km or in answ- inga or hat to far aanctjtoned each a j
ering that question.
lower court at to call for iht c e»cia?
power of supervision; or
(e) Acceptance or Rtjeetloa of QitMleatsosi.
(4) When the Court of Appeals hat decided a*
Upon Ming o f the certificatioo order and accorapaaying j*pcrrwkii the Oerk; the Court shall important question of ttinnidpei, state, or federll
promptly enter an order ekae? accepting or rejecting law which hat Hot beau but should be, settled ©H
thequnrtsan o m i f l i d ^ ^ s ^ d ^ ^ X k r t shall the- **>»*!
reupon serve c o t ^ * f ^ < * u r t * order upon the RUIA44,COTTIlCAIiONAMK*
certifying c«m^u^m»fartiet identified in the certificatioo order; If the Court accepts the question
PARTIES
for adjudication, the Court wifl sec out m the order (a) Jlpnartaca. rtsrfctneg Ft** 1
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SUPREME COURT
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-1; 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch.
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2), rewrote the former second sentence which

78-2-2

read "Thereafter, the term of office of a justice
of the Supreme Court is ten years and until his
successor is appointed and approved in accordance with Section 20-1-7 1" and, in Subsection (6), substituted "determines" for "decides"
at the end of the fourth sentence

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or m aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals,
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings, originating with*
(I) the Public Service Commission;
(n) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(IV) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony,
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except the following:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication,
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion m granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
5
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JUDICIAL CODE

Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
inder Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L.
986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988,
h. 248, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendnent, effective April 25,1988, substituted "foraal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in

Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); redesignated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) accordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end
of Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic
changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

)ocketing statement.
-Reference to subsection,
ttted.
docketing statement
-Reference to subsection.
In all cases appealed after January 1, 1987,
gference in the docketing statement to this
action will be considered insufficient; instead
le appropriate subsection must be included to
lert the Supreme Court that it has original

appellate jurisdiction over the case. Gregory v.
Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 (Utah
1987).
Cited in Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.,
739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

'8-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Stewart v. Coffinan, 73 Utah Adv.
ep. 119 (Ct. App. 1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
\ Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal
aw, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137.

8-2-5. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 248, § 50 repeals
78-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provid-

ing that the Supreme Court is always open,
effective April 25, 1988.

8-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and services of any
leriff in the state.
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